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 11. Introduction 
Traditional development economics considers the transfer of rural labor into the 
industrial sector the only way to balance the economic development in urban and rural 
areas. Chang (1949) mentioned that rural labor will not always stand in a static state 
on farms but part of it will transfer into factories to engage in industrial production. 
Lewis (1954) established a dual-sector model and argued that the transfer of rural 
surplus labor from traditional sectors into modern industries is imperative.  Later, 
Harris and Todaro (1970) changed the term of the industrial sector into urban sector 
by assuming the former mainly exists in the cities. Since then, the dual-sector model 
has become a classical approach used in economic development research. 
A closer look of coastal China, however, shows a more complex picture that the one 
predicted by a simple transfer of rural labor into the urban sector.  In recent years, 
facing international competition, China makes great efforts to upgrade its industries, 
and such efforts generate an adverse employment shock on peasant workers because 
industrial upgrading leads to a higher demand for skilled workers but a lower demand 
for unskilled workers.  Peasant workers, especially those mid-aged workers, often 
find themselves lack of adequate skills to keep or find jobs in the industrial sector.  
Many of them have to flow back to their villages and become farmers again. Worse 
than this, some returned peasant workers found little land left in their home villages 
due to the vast amount of land converted for urbanization and industrial uses (Zheng 
et al., 2007).    For these land-lost peasants, survival becomes a challenge.   
A new land conversion system, called land cooperation, seems to help peasant 
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upgrading.  Under the conventional land conversion system, local governments get 
land from peasants with one-time lump-sum compensations, which are often 
significantly lower than the fair market values. Once land is transferred to local 
governments, peasants lose both their land ownership and use rights.  Under  the  new 
system, i.e., the land cooperation system, peasants in the same village pool land 
together, invest land cooperatively into industrial and urban uses, and share returns 
jointly.  Such land cooperation could mitigate the negative impact of employment 
shock because it not only allows peasants to keep their land ownership but also 
generates income flows for them. At the same time, the system could help local 
government centralize land due to better investment returns on land for urban and 
industrial uses. 
A number of studies have examined why farmers migrate into cities and become 
industrial workers (e.g., Zhao, 1999; Zhang and Song, 2003; Lu and Song, 2006).  
They concluded that pushing factors include loss of land and high burden of taxes and 
fees in the countryside and pulling factors include higher income, better opportunities, 
better quality of life, and better education in cities. Much less research has been done 
about the backflow of rural migrants.  Hare (1999) and Zhao (2002) are the 
exceptions.  Hare (1999) believed that the urban admittance system and immature 
factor market are two key factors of labor backflow in China.  Zhao (2002) 
examined causes and consequences of return migration.    Using the 1999 data of rural 
families from six provinces in China, she concluded that the factors influencing 
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admittance system, spouse leaving to work in other big cities, the proportion of adult 
labor in a family, and the development of none-agriculture sections in rural areas.  
We do not see any theoretical analysis on the relationship between backflow of 
peasant workers, the recent promotion of industrial upgrade, and rural land conversion 
systems. 
This paper attempts to fill the above gap.  Inspired by a recent case study in 
Suzhou, China, about challenges faced by peasant workers in the era of industrial 
upgrading, done by Zheng et al. (2007), we develop a theoretical model to investigate 
how industrial upgrading generates adverse employment shocks on mid-aged 
blue-collar workers and make them return to the countryside.  We also show that 
one-time compensation of land conversion is inferior because of the low 
compensation and the risk of backflow caused by adverse employment shocks. 
Consequently, such land compensation system would slow down the pace of land 
conversion and hinder industrial upgrading in China. One possible solution, as 
theoretically proved in this paper, is to have a land cooperation system in rural areas.   
Under this system, local governments do not acquire land from farmers with low 
compensations.  Instead, farmers keep their land ownership by investing land into 
urban-sector uses.  Through such land investment, rural land is centralized for 
industrial purposes; it also generates incomes for rural laborers, helping them face 
employment shocks brought by industrial upgrading.     
Next section elaborates how industrial upgrading causes adverse employment 
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of adverse shock on mid-aged peasant workers under the one-time lump-sum 
compensation system and then examine how a land cooperation system could reduce 
the impact of adverse shock and help land centralization for industrial uses.    The last 
section concludes. 
 
2.    Industrial Upgrading and Adverse Employment Shock on Peasant Workers 
In recent year, in order to raise its international competitiveness, China has made 
great efforts to promote industrial upgrading, either through government direct 
investment or by providing enterprises with subsidies and tax breaks.  Many 
development zones have switched their emphases from low-value-added processing 
and assembling activities to high-value-added and more sustainable industries.  No 
doubt, these changes will cause not only sectorial shifts but employment shocks on 
workers as well, especially on low-skilled peasant workers. 
 This study theoretically investigates how the promotion of industrial upgrading 
affects a firm’s hiring decisions.  For this purpose, we classify workers into two 
general groups, blue-collar and white-collar workers.  For the former, we further 
divide them into young workers of ages 40 or below and mid-aged workers of ages 
above 40.    Because the legal retirement ages for blue-collar workers in China are 50 
for female workers and 55 for male workers, we do not include workers older than 55.   
Throughout this paper, we will use a firm-level employment model, which assumes (a) 
the difference in age determines the difference in physical labor supplied and (b) the 
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maximization and exogenous reasons including government subsidies and tax breaks.   
Specifically, we assume that a company uses three inputs in production, namely 
blue-collar-labor input as  ，white-collar-worker input as  , and capital input as  l n1 t n2
K , with   representing the number of blue-collar workers hired，l the amount of 
labor provided per blue-collar worker，   the number of white-collar workers hired，





K the fixed 
amount of capital. For simplicity, blue-collar workers are all from rural areas, due to 
migrants’ lack of education and job-training. We further assume that   is a function 
of worker’s age, b, with   for young workers (40-year-old or younger) and   for 
mid-aged workers (above 40-year-old).    Because young workers offer more physical 
labor input than mid-aged workers, we have  > .    Therefore, the firm’s production 
function becomes , which satisfies .
l
1 l 2 l
1 l 2 l
) , ), ( ( 2 1
−
K t n b l n f 12 ,0 , ff ≥ 11, f   22 12 0, 0 ff ≤ ≥ . 
We also assume that product price, P, depends on  , the value-added of 
production, with  . In this paper, we let a be a function of 
white-collar labor input, i.e., 
a
0 (*) , 0 (*)
" ' ≤ ≥ P P
) ( 2t n a a = , with  , meaning that the 
white-collar labor input by industrial rank is degree of one.   
0 "    and    0 ' = ≥ a a
Currently, the movement of industrial upgrading is largely directed by local 
governments. Such movement, as many policy-makers believe, will help local 
governments increase fiscal revenues through enhancing the profits of local 
enterprises and their international competitiveness.  Industrial upgrading also is a 
very important measure for the upper-level government to assess the local government 
 6officials.  Therefore, local governments have strong incentives to promote industrial 
upgrading through various programs, such as by providing enterprises with R&D 
subsidy of    per white-collar worker.    s
Assume that an enterprise receives an allowance of   per white-collar worker 
and has a budget constraint of 
s
12 nwn wM σ + ≤ , where w is the wage rate received by 
white-collar workers and 0 < σ <1, meaning that blue-collar workers get a proportion 
of the wage rate received by white-collar workers.    Then, the profit maximization of 
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−
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s.t.   12 nwn wM σ +≤ ；                       ( 1)  0 , 2 1 ≥ n n
 
The first-order conditions are: 
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We want to examine the impact of industrial upgrading on the employment of 
 7mid-aged peasant workers. For this, we investigate two relationships.  The first one 
is between a and  , assuming that industrial upgrading will increase the level of 
value-added in production and thus the demand for blue-collar workers.    The second 
relationship is between the government efforts to promote industrial upgrading and 
the demand for blue-collar workers. 
l n1





a                          ( 5 )    
 
(Please see Appendix 1 for the proof). Formula (5) suggests that the amount of 
blue-collar labor input,  , would increase with industrial upgrading.  In turn, the 
demand for   will increase if   is fixed.  This implies that the enterprise will 
replace part or even all of   with  . Accordingly, the enterprise would lay off some 
mid-aged workers and replace them with young employees. Therefore, we have 
proved the following proposition： 
l n1
l 1 n
2 l 1 l
 
Proposition 1: When enterprises are in the process of industrial upgrading and if the 
number of blue-collar workers is fixed, they replace part or all of the mid-aged 
workers with young workers, creating an adverse employment shock on mid-aged 
peasant workers. 
 
Similarly, by providing subsidies to enterprises, government’s efforts to promote 
 8industrial upgrading also creates an adverse employment shock on mid-aged peasant 
workers. Taking the derivative of  ) ( 1 b l n = Ω  with respect to s on equation (4), we 
get, 
 




                       ( 6 )            
 
The above formula demonstrates that the demand for blue-collar labor input,  , 
would increase with government subsidy on industrial upgrading.  If the number of 
blue-collar workers is fixed, formula (6) suggests that l  will increase, forcing 
enterprises to replace mid-age workers with young workers.  In turn, we have 
derived the following proposition： 
l n1
 
Proposition 2: If the number of blue-collar workers is fixed, local government subsidy 
on industrial upgrading would make enterprises substitute more young workers for 
mid-aged workers, causing an adverse employment shock on mid-aged peasant 
workers. 
 
Several points are worth mentioning.  First, the above propositions have 
different emphases.  Proposition 1, through the impacts of industrial upgrading on 
the level of value-added in production and thus the price of industrial products, shows 
how industrial upgrading creates an adverse employment shock on mid-age 
blue-collar workers.  It tells how the market force determines the demands for 
 9various types of workers.  Proposition 2, by relating government’s subsidy to the 
amount of blue-collar labor input, shows how government efforts to promote 
industrial upgrading causes an adverse employment shock on mid-age blue-collar 
workers.    It shows the direct impact of government policy on enterprises’ demand for 
various types of workers.    Second, in the above analysis, we treated peasant workers 
as pure physical workers in a static state.    In reality, however, some migrant workers 
could be white-collar workers and more will become white-collar workers through 
education and job-training.  But this should not change our general conclusions, 
especially because enterprises may make more efforts to train young workers than to 
train mid-aged workers.  Third, in above analysis, we only considered the impact of 
industrial upgrading on the value-added of product.  However, industrial upgrading 
also improves production efficiency.  Yet, our general conclusions remain the same 
because our production function is in its general form, which already captures the 
efficiency improvement through changes of various labor inputs.  Last, in proving 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we assumed that the number of blue-collar workers is 
fixed.  This assumption should be considered as a necessary condition but not a 
sufficient condition for the two propositions, because increasing   could also 
suggest an increase in   or both   and l.  Increasing both   and l will not 





                                       
 103. Land Centralization and Mitigation of Adverse Employment Shock 
In many Chinese cities, a vast amount of rural land is centralized and used for 
industrialization and urbanization, through either government expropriation, land 
leasehold, or land cooperation.  In this paper, inspired by Yao (1999), we develop a 
model to analyze how a peasant household arranges production factors when it faces 
an adverse employment shock.  Specifically, in Section 3.1, we assume that local 
governments acquire land from peasants with lump-sum compensations but they 
cannot force peasants to sell their land.  In Section 3.2, we will generalize our 
analysis by including the option of land cooperation in rural areas. 
 
3.1 One-time Lump-sum Land Compensation 
Assume peasant workers face a two-stage life-cycle decision process.  At the first 
stage, in ages below or equal to 40 and with an employment level  , peasant 
workers arrange their initial resources.  Between stage one and stage two, they face 
an adverse employment shock caused by industrial upgrading, as discussed in Section 
2.  At the second stage, peasant workers are in mid-ages and the adverse 





− − w w
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θ  is a non-negative random variable representing the adverse employment shock on 




θ  is distributed with a probability density function 
) | ( ε θ φ and a cumulative distribution function  Φ，with a conditional parameter  ε  
 11representing the level of industrial upgrading and thus  0 / ) | ( ≤ ∂ Φ ∂ ε ε θ .  




T   be the initial peasant’s endowments of labor and land, respectively. 
Under the one-time lump-sum compensation system, peasant workers have three 
income sources.  One is the agricultural income, with an agricultural production 
function  , where T  is the land input and  ) , ( L T F L  is the labor input.  In the 
following analysis, we let the unit price of agricultural product equal to 1 and all other 
prices be relative to this price.  The second source is the wage income from the 
industrial sector, with an exogenous wage rate  .  The third source is a one-time 




b b b c r T −
b T , 
b r and  being the amount of land transferred, unit land price, and unit 
transaction cost, respectively.     
b c
We use a Cobb-Douglas production function  = ) , ( L T F
β αL T  to describe the 
agricultural production. Later in Section 3.2, we will add the commonly-used term A 
into the production function for efficiency improvement.    To ensure the concavity of 
function and based on empirical finding of decreasing return to scale in agricultural 
production, we assume that  1 < α , 1 < β , and  1 < + β α .  Therefore, in the first 
stage, a peasant worker is to： 
 
π
w b f f L T T L
Max
1 1 1 1 , , ,
=            ) ] ( [ ) ( ) ( ) ( 1
*
2 1 1 1 1
b b b b w f f T E c r T wL L T π μ
β α + − + +
s.t    ；  ； ；        ( 7 )     
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where  represent respectively the labor input used in the agriculture 
b f w f T T L L 1 1 1 1 , , ,
 12production, labor input supplied to the industrial production, the land used in the 
agricultural production, and the land transferred to the local government.  μ  is the 
discount factor with  1 < μ .    is the optimal value of peasant income in the second 
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Equation (8) shows that peasant’s marginal benefit from agricultural production 
equals to the wage rate working in an enterprise.    Equation (9) demonstrates that the 
current and expected losses in agricultural production be compensated by the 
one-time lump-sum compensation. This condition suggests that a peasant worker 
make land transfer decision by considering both current and future agricultural profits. 
We regard the third term of equation (9) as the shadow price of land transfer,  , 
which depends on peasant’s expected income from the second stage and affects 
positively the amount of land transferred in the first stage, i.e.,     
2 P
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In the second stage, facing the adverse employment shock caused by industrial 
upgrading, a peasant worker is to:   
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Accordingly, we get Kuhn-Tucker conditions:   
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Denote   to be the solution of the above equation.  When 
*
2
w L 0 > λ ，we have 
 and possibly  , implying that enterprises 
are offering wages much higher than the agricultural income and thus virtually all 
peasants are eager to enter the industrial sector.    In this case, we use  to substitute 
for  .  Let   be the maximum of 
0 ) ( ) (
1
2 1 > + − − −
−
− −
w L L T T













θ θ .   We can rewrite the shadow price of land 
transfer as 
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Integrating by parts of (14), we get, 
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To investigate the impact of industrial upgrade scale  ε  on the shadow price of 
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ε θ  and  . Combining equations (10) 
and (16), we derive the following relationship between the amount of land transferred 
in the first period and the scale of industrial upgrading,     
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<                           ( 1 7 )  
 
Therefore, we conclude that industrial upgrading (thus higher  ε ）will cause less land 
voluntarily transferred by peasant workers, leading to a slower pace of land 
centralization for industrial and urban uses.     
The above conclusion, however, is not surprising.  With industrial upgrading, an 
adverse employment shock exists for mid-age peasant workers, resulting in a higher 
possibility for peasant workers to return to home villages and lower incentives for 
them to sell their land.  Put it differently, the relative marginal return of land would 
increase with peasant workers flowing back to villages.  To balance the marginal 
land return of the two stages, peasant workers will reduce land transfer in the first 
stage.  
One possible solution to help land centralization is to lower the unit land 
transaction cost by better defining rights of land for peasants. Mathematically, based 
on equation (9), we can prove that a lower land transaction cost will lead to more land 
 15transferred in the first period, because   
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L T T c
T                    ( 1 8 )    
 
where  , given 0 < α < 1.    0
2 < −α α
The above discussions allow us to state the following proposition:   
 
Proposition 3: Facing an adverse employment shock caused by industrial upgrading, 
peasant workers have a higher possibility to return to the rural land and thus a lower 
motivation to sell their land under the one-time lump-sum compensation system.  
This slows down the pace of land centralization for industrial purposes.  However, 
better defined land rights and lower transaction cost could promote land transfers 
and help land centralization. 
 
3.2 Land Cooperation 
In some Chinese cities such as Suzhou, an innovative approach to centralize rural land 
is through land cooperation (Zheng et al., 2007).  Under this new system, rural land 
is centralized within a collective and managed jointly by peasants.  The land 
cooperation system exhibits two main advantages.  First, while peasants still keep 
their land ownership, they pool land together and rent bulk part of land for industrial 
and city uses. This will not only help peasant better plan for their land use but also 
 16enhance peasants’ bargaining power in land transactions, thus better protecting 
peasants’ welfare in both long and short terms.    Second, by pooling land together and 
managing land jointly, the new system helps to promote large-scale agricultural 
production and improve efficiency.   
How could the land cooperation system help to mitigate the adverse employment 
shock caused by industrial upgrading on mid-aged peasant workers?    To answer this 
question, we add a term A into the agricultural production function to capture the 
efficiency gain generated by land cooperation and large-scale production, thus A > 1 
relative to the production function used in Section 3.1.  Denote N to be the number 
of peasants in a land cooperation.    Assume other factors remain the same as those in 





the Cobb-Douglas form of production function, and the industrial wage rate  .  
Therefore, a land cooperation has a production function  .  
w
β α ) ( ) ( ) , (
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For an individual peasant  , we denote  i
g T  and   to be his land and labor 
inputs to the cooperation, respectively.  For other peasants, 
g L
N j ∈ and i j ≠ , we 
denote 
* g T and   to be the optimal land and labor inputs devoted by peasants j, 
respectively. Peasant’s income from the cooperation is endogenous, with the wage 
 and  land  rent 
* g L
g w
g r   depending on the marginal output of labor and land, as shown 
in the following equations: 
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For a typical or the average peasant, because of  1 > A  and  , we have 
.  Therefore, the marginal income of labor in the cooperation is always 
higher than that of self-cultivated land, suggesting that peasants are willing to put 
more labor into the cooperation.  In turn, this will increase the marginal return of 
land used in the cooperation, as seen in equation (20), making peasants invest more 
land to the cooperation.  In other words, land cooperation is able to absorb more 
workers and promote land centralization.  Thus, it helps to mitigate the negative 




− +β α AN
Under the land cooperation system, the optimization problem for a peasant 
becomes: 
g g g g w f f
L L L T T
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In Appendix 2, we list all five first-order conditions with equations (28)-(32).  If all 
the peasants in the cooperation are assumed to be the same, we can use  o  
replace all the   in the first-order conditions and simplify these equations. 
Specifically, by combining equations of (28) and (30) and equations of (29) and (32), 
we get the following two results, respectively 
g g T L , t
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From the above equations, we derive that,   
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indicating that the optimal labor-to-land ratio are the same for self-cultivation and 
cooperation production. 
To examine how the land cooperation affects land centralization for industrial 





and investigate how this ratio changes with the scale 
of land cooperation.  From equations (30) and (32) in Appendix 2, we obtain the 
following optimal ratio between land invested in cooperation and used for 
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(Please see Appendix 3 for derivation.) Given  > 1, the above ratio is strictly 
positive, meaning the amount of land invested in a cooperation from its peasants 
never equals to zero and thus our Lagrange solution is the overall optimal solution. 
The result also shows that the cooperation has enhanced the welfare of its peasants.   
N
Based on formula (25), because of  1 0 < + < β α , it is not difficult to see that  Λ 
increases along with the growth of  A, because of 
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This result suggests that peasants are more willing to invest land in a cooperation with 
better production efficiency brought by a large-scale production.  Again, we have 
proved that land cooperation not only improves efficiency but helps land 
centralization as well.   
Furthermore, we also prove that  Λ grows  with   for  N > 1, a given condition 
for any land cooperation.  See Appendix 4 for the proof.  This result shows that 
proportionally the amount of land invested in a land cooperation increases with the 
number of peasants joining the cooperation.  In turn, it shows that land cooperation 
promotes land centralization.  However, it needs to be cautious to conclude that a 
larger cooperation is always better.  Because many costs and problems could arise 
with the size of an organization, such as transaction cost and the free-ride problem, we 
expect that there exists an optimal level of  , which could vary from one 
cooperation to another.  Generally, we consider village as a good size for land 
cooperation, as evidenced by the experiences in south Jiangsu Province (Zheng et al., 
2007).   
N
N
The above analyses allow us to give our last proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: When an adverse employment shock on peasants exists during 
industrial upgrading, land cooperation helps to mitigate the negative impact on the 
process of land centralization and the welfare of peasant workers. Peasants are more 
 20willing to invest their land in a land cooperation due to better efficiency and higher 
returns.  Also, the amount of land invested in land cooperation increases 
proportionally with the number of peasants joining the cooperation, thus promoting 
land centralization.       
 
4．Conclusions 
Facing international competition, China makes great efforts in recent years to upgrade 
its industries.  These efforts, however, generate an adverse employment shock on 
peasant workers because of their lack of adequate skills to keep or find jobs in the 
industrial sector.  Many of them have to flow back to their villages and become 
farmers again.  Some returned peasant workers even found that survival in the 
countryside becomes a challenge due to the amount of land converted for urbanization 
and industrial uses.   
Using a firm-level employment model, this paper has theoretically proved that 
firms would replace mid-aged peasant workers with younger workers, causing an 
adverse employment shock on peasant workers.  This adverse employment shock 
would force some rural workers to return to their home villages, especially those 
mid-aged workers. The current lump-sum land acquisition system, however, is unable 
to help peasant workers mitigate the negative impact of the employment shock when 
they face a risk of backflow to home villages, because peasants found it uneconomical 
to sell their land if the compensation is way too low.  Therefore, the current land 
 21acquisition system makes it more difficult to centralize rural land for industrial and 
urban uses. 
  This paper has also proved that land cooperation could help peasant workers 
better deal with the adverse employment shock and centralize rural land for 
nonagricultural purposes.  Under the land cooperation, peasants in the same village 
pool land together, invest part of the land for industrial and urban uses, and share 
profits jointly.  Because of the large-scale of production and higher returns from 
nonagricultural uses, land cooperation would not only improve agricultural efficiency 
but also increase peasants’ incentive to invest their land for urban purposes.  The 
former helps peasant workers mitigate the negative impact of employment shock, 
while the latter promotes land centralization for industrial and urban uses.  Both 
improve peasant’s welfare.     
Based on our theoretical findings, we would propose two policy recommendations.   
First, to upgrade China’s industries, it is important for the government to provide 
peasant workers with job-training and education opportunities. With the rapid pace of 
urbanization, more and more farmers will migrate into cities. Without adequate 
job-training and education, rural migrants, especially those mid-aged ones, would 
have a very low employability and thus many of them could become the urban poor.  
Second, China needs to further reform its rural land system. Under the current land 
expropriation system, local governments compensate farmers too little.  It deprives 
peasants’ interests and hinders land centralization.  To better protect peasants’ land 
rights and welfare, various land conversion systems could coexist, largely depending 
 22on peasants’ choices rather than going with local governments’ decisions.    Given the 
huge rural population, China would not see a harmonious society if peasants are left 
behind and unable to benefit from the overall economic development. 
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According to the definition of f (*), the above denominator is non-positive. Since 
, the second term in the big bracket of numerator is 0, and we can rewrite the 
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 25Appendix 2： 
 
Using Lagrange’s theorem to formula (21), we get the following five first –order 
conditions:  
0 ) ( ) (
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Dividing formula (30) by the simplified formula (32), we get： 
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= , we rewrite the right side of the above equation as: 
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, we obtain: 
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 27Appendix 4： 
 
Let x = − + 1 β α  and  thus  1 0 < < x . Equation (34) becomes 
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Therefore,  increases with N, proving that the ratio of land used in cooperation to 
land used for self-cultivation increases with the scale of land cooperation (i.e., the 
number of peasants belonging to the cooperation).  In other  words, land  cooperation 
helps land centralization for industrial purposes.     
Λ
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